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Innovation as Spiritual Exercise:
Montaigne and Pascal
Pierre Force
The rediscovery of the rhetorical tradition in the past thirty years has trans-
formed the study of early modern authors like Montaigne and Pascal.1 The
categories of traditional literary history, like originality, influence, predeces-
sors, and followers, are now seen as inadequate when it comes to explaining
how Montaigne and Pascal thought of themselves as authors and how they
understood the process of intellectual discovery and literary production.2 In the
same perspective looking for originality (in the modern sense of the term) in
early modern authors is now seen as a misguided enterprise. In the rhetorical
culture of early modern Europe every author writes in a given tradition, and
every new book is to be understood within the tradition or traditions to which it
belongs. Pascal borrows heavily from Montaigne, sometimes verbatim, some-
times not.3 Montaigne draws from Seneca, Plutarch, Cicero, and many others.
Having realized this, the modern reader is tempted to conclude that authors
like Montaigne and Pascal, absorbed as they are in their conversation with the
great authors from the past, are not interested in saying anything new. Yet the
opposite is true. Pascal famously preempts a possible objection to his Pensées
by saying, “Let no one say that I have said nothing new; the arrangement of the
Thanks to Kathy Eden for comments and suggestions.
1 Successful examples of a rhetorical approach to early modern intellectual history include
Marc Fumaroli, L’Âge de l’éloquence (Paris, 1994 [Geneva, 1980]); Quentin Skinner, Reason
and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge, 1996); and Kathy Eden, Friends Hold
All Things in Common. Tradition, Intellectual Property, and the Adages of Erasmus (New Ha-
ven, Conn., 2001).
2 A good example of the traditional approach is Henri Gouhier’s excellent book on the
relationship between Descartes and Augustine (which will be discussed later in this article):
Cartésianisme et augustinisme au XVIIe siècle (Paris, 1978). Gouhier discusses the Augustinian
“sources” of Descartes’s philosophy and Descartes’s “originality” with respect to those sources.
3 See Bernard Croquette, Pascal et Montaigne: Etude des réminiscences de Montaigne
dans l’œuvre de Pascal (Geneva, 1974).
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material is new” (696).4 As to Montaigne, his contempt for novelty in general
is well known. However, he praises traveling because “the mind is continually
exercised in observing new and unknown things.”5 In addition, in his dedica-
tion to Madame d’Estissac at the beginning of the chapter “Of the affection of
fathers for their children” he suggests that the value of his book may well re-
side entirely in the fact that its subject matter is new: “Madame, if strangeness
and novelty, which customarily give value to things, do not save me, I shall
never get out of this stupid enterprise with honor; but it is so fantastic and
appears so remote from common usage that that may enable it to pass.”6
This passage seems paradoxical to the modern reader but for reasons that
Madame d’Estissac would not understand. In a self-deprecating move Montaigne
asserts that nothing could recommend his book to a reader. Its only redeeming
value is that it does not resemble anything that has been published before. Of
course to a modern reader this would be the most important, perhaps even the
only criterion, of literary worth. For Montaigne himself, if we note the irony of
the passage, novelty is not in itself a criterion of literary value, because novelty
for its own sake, especially in matters of style, is worthless. At the same time
Montaigne is clearly saying that his literary project (writing a book about him-
self) is valuable because it is unlike anything that has been tried before.
On the one hand it is clear that for both Montaigne and Pascal “saying
something new” is a major criterion of literary and philosophical worth. On the
other hand “saying something new” is not a synonym for “being original” (in
the modern sense of the term). I would therefore like to come to Montaigne and
Pascal with the following questions: How do you say something new? How
can you tell that someone is saying something new?
Pascal discusses these questions extensively in a digression near the end of
a small unfinished treatise entitled Mathematical Mind. The purpose of the
treatise is to enunciate the rules that govern the art of true demonstrations.
After spelling out those rules he replies to three possible objections, the first
being that “there is nothing new about this method.”7 Pascal’s reply to the first
objection is a complex one. He begins by acknowledging that the rules he has
just enunciated or at least something resembling those rules can indeed be found
in some well-known treatises of logic. He adds that those who read quickly and
superficially will not see the difference between Pascal’s treatise and the works
of logic that are already available. He claims, however, that those who read
4 Pascal, Pensées, tr. A. J. Krailsheimer (London, 1966). The number after each quote from
the Pensées is the fragment number in Krailsheimer’s translation, which follows the numbering
of the Lafuma edition (Paris, 1963).
5 Montaigne, Essays, tr. by Donald M. Frame (Stanford, Calif., 1958), III, 9, p. 744.
6 Essays, II, 8, p. 278.
7 De l’Esprit géométrique, in Les Provinciales, Pensées et opuscules, ed. Gérard Ferreyrolles
and Philippe Sellier (Paris, 2004), 139, translation is mine.
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very carefully will see the difference: “But if they grasp the spirit of these
rules, and if the rules have made a such a mark on them that they have taken
root and thrived, they will realize what a difference there is between what is
said here, and what some logicians may have written that is coincidentally
similar in some parts of their works.”8
For Pascal, reading carefully means paying attention to several things. First,
it is necessary to consider “the places and circumstances” of the statements you
are comparing.9 In other words who said it, where, and when? Second, you
must find out if the person who utters these words is capable of relating them to
the rest of the book they come from: “Does anyone really believe that two
persons who have read and memorized the same book know it equally, assum-
ing that one understands it in such a way that he knows all its principles, the
strength of its consequences, how to respond to the objections that may be
made against it, and the whole economy of the work; while for the other, those
would be like dead words....”10
Finally, Pascal presents his reader with a comparison between the famous
principle, I think, therefore I am, as stated in Descartes and the same principle
as enunciated by Augustine twelve hundred years before. Pascal requires only
two things of the reader in making the comparison: the reader must be “equi-
table,” and the comparison must be between “the spirit of Descartes” and the
“spirit of saint Augustine.”11
At first sight these recommendations may seem a bit vague or banal. How-
ever, behind the non-technical language lies a very specific set of prescrip-
tions. Paying attention to “places and circumstances” means considering what
the rhetorical tradition calls decorum. Cicero defines the eloquent speaker as
the one who can adapt his speech (the Latin term is accommodare) to every
possible circumstance. As Kathy Eden shows in Hermeneutics and the Rhe-
torical Tradition, decorum is not only a principle of rhetorical composition; it
is a hermeneutic principle as well. In matters of literary exegesis (enarratio
poetarum) considering decorum means interpreting a text with regard to its
historical context.12 According to Quintilian, the interpretation of literature is
based on two principles: decorum and oeconomia, a Greek word for which he
says there is no Latin equivalent. Decorum is a principle that operates within
the sphere of elocutio: interpreting a text on the basis of decorum means look-
ing at the words and expressions an author uses and showing that these words
and expressions were chosen to fit a particular audience at a particular time.
8 De l’Esprit géométrique, 140.
9 De l’Esprit géométrique, 140.
10 Ibid.
11 De l’Esprit géométrique, 141. Cf. Henri Gouhier, Cartésianisme et augustinisme au XVIIe
siècle, and Emmanuel Bermon, Le Cogito dans la pensée de saint Augustin (Paris, 2001).
12 Kathy Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition (New Haven, Conn., 1997), 26.
66.1force. 6/15/05, 4:05 PM19
20 Pierre Force
Oeconomia operates within the sphere of dispositio. Eden points out that whereas
dispositio refers to a straightforward arrangement of the material, “oeconomia
follows a more indirect, artificial organization, one altered specifically to ac-
commodate the circumstances of the case, with the special end of arousing the
audience’s emotions.”13 Quintilian defines oeconomica dispositio as the art of
rearranging the traditional parts of a speech (either by changing the order or by
skipping some parts) in order to obtain the desired effect on the audience. Some-
times, Quintilian adds, the most effective order consists in starting, like Homer
(more Homerico), at the middle, or the end. This of course can be done only in
view of the specific circumstances of the case, and, indeed, in order to practice
this type of dispositio effectively, the orator must have every detail of the case
in mind, and he must know exactly where he wants to take his interlocutor. As
Eden puts it, “this kind of composition takes as its starting point a decisive
relationship between the whole and the parts. Indeed, it presupposes the whole
in composing the parts.”14 Like decorum, oeconomia is both a principle of rhe-
torical composition and a hermeneutic principle. Reading a text economically
means looking at the relationship between the parts and the whole. More spe-
cifically, it means understanding every part of the text in view of the meaning
of the whole. This is the principle Pascal refers to when he says that the reader
must understand “the whole economy of the work.” A good reader must be
able to spell out the connections between every statement in the book and the
first principles that support it. In order to do this successfully one must have a
clear sense of what the book as a whole is saying. The meaning of the whole
guides the interpretation of the parts.
Finally, in the rhetorical tradition the interpretation of a text (interpretatio
scripti) is governed by a principle that is even more general than decorum and
oeconomia, the principle of equity, which consists in invoking the author’s
intent (voluntas) when the text (scriptum) proves too difficult to understand.15
In particular, judges are equitable when they manage to accommodate the gen-
erality of the law to the particular circumstances of a case. In so doing, they
rectify the law that is defective because of its generality, and they clarify the
intent of the lawgiver. Equity is therefore the cardinal virtue of hermeneutics.16
This is why Pascal asks for an “equitable” reader in order to decide whether
Descartes said something new when he put forward his famous principle, I
think, therefore I am. An equitable reader is someone who pays attention to
decorum and oeconomia when interpreting a passage. In other words an equi-
13 Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 28.
14 Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 29.
15 See Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 12-16.
16 See H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, tr. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall
(New York, 1989), esp. 324-41. 
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table reader must have a clear grasp of an author’s intent as it appears through
the entire book in order to interpret what is written in a particular passage. This
is what Pascal refers to as “the spirit of Descartes” and “the spirit of saint
Augustine.”
According to Pascal, no one has explained these issues more clearly than
Montaigne, whom he calls “the incomparable author of L’Art de conférer.”17
Like all of Montaigne’s essays, “Of the art of discussion” is somewhat enig-
matic. In particular, it is not easy to understand what conférer really means. But
Pascal’s paraphrase of Montaigne’s text in Mathematical Mind may be a good
indication of what l’art de conférer is about. This approach has allowed Laurent
Thirouin to show the richness and complexity of the word conférer in
Montaigne.18 First, conférer means to debate, but this is something other than
simple conversation. The conférences Montaigne refers to in the essay are al-
ways adversarial; it is always about the confrontation of two opposite view-
points. Second (and this works also in English), conférer means to assign, to
confer a value or a title to something or someone: a significant part of the essay
discusses the relationship between the intrinsic merit of people and the digni-
ties and honors they receive. In that sense conférer means both literally and
metaphorically putting a price on something or someone. Third, conférer means
to compare and specifically to assess the relationship between two texts in
order to determine their true worth. The value of a work always emerges in
comparison with other works. In the final analysis Thirouin shows that the
issue at the core of De l’Art de conférer is how do you assess the value of a
person or a text? What I would like to show now is that for both Pascal and
Montaigne value and innovativeness are very closely related. Asking whether
a person or a text is saying something new is another way of asking what a
person or a text is worth.
The passage from Montaigne that Pascal paraphrases begins with the fol-
lowing statement: “... in arguments and discussions not all the remarks that
seem good to us should be accepted immediately. Most men are rich with bor-
rowed capacity” (d’une suffisance estrangere).19 The crucial distinction here is
between what is alien (estrangere) and what is one’s own. As Montaigne puts
it a bit further in the essay, in order to assess the true worth of an author, “we
must know what is his and what is not.”20 How does one perform such a test?
First, Montaigne says knowledge and memory are irrelevant because they say
very little about the persons themselves (or the text themselves). They do not
17 De l’Esprit géométrique, 140.
18 Laurent Thirouin, “Pascal et ‘l’art de conférer,’ ” Cahiers de l’Association internationale
des études françaises, 40 (1988), 199-218.
19 Essays, III, 8, p. 714.
20 Essays, III, 8, p. 718.
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reveal anything, Montaigne argues, about “the strength and beauty” of the
interlocutor’s (or the author’s) soul.21 What is “the strength and beauty” of a
soul? In a passage from Book I of the Essays Montaigne complains about the
extreme inadequacy of his memory, but he then argues that there is strength in
that weakness. Because he is unable to remember anything, Montaigne has had
to exercise his mind and his judgment much more than others had to:
I have some consolation. First, because it is an evil that has shown me
the way to correct a worse evil which would easily have developed in
me—to wit, ambition; for lack of memory is intolerable in anyone who
is involved in public negotiations. Because, as several similar examples
of nature’s processes demonstrate, nature has tended to strengthen other
faculties in me in proportion as my memory has grown weaker; and I
might easily rest my mind and judgment and let them grow languid
following on others’ traces, as everyone does, without exercising their
own strength, if other men’s discoveries and opinions were always
present to me by virtue of my memory. My speech is the briefer for it.
For the magazine of memory is apt to be better furnished with matter
than that of invention.22
In this passage Montaigne distinguishes between memory (mémoire), mind (es-
prit), and judgment (jugement). These are the three faculties of the soul that,
according to the rhetorical tradition, make eloquence possible and need to be
developed through exercise: memoria (the ability to remember one’s speech as
well as the opponent’s arguments), ingenium (natural intelligence and imagi-
nation), and judicium (good sense and good taste).
In Montaigne’s interpretation of these categories memory says little about
the natural and intrinsic qualities of a soul because its purpose is to retain things
that are alien to the self. Montaigne adds that having a bad memory has forced
him to be self-reliant and to cultivate what is truly his own, i.e., his mind and
judgment. From this passage one can infer that when he mentions “the strength
and beauty of a soul” in opposition to its ability to memorize, he is referring to
what he sees as the intrinsic qualities of a soul: esprit and jugement. For
Montaigne “a strong and beautiful soul” is one that has both mind and judg-
ment and therefore one that is capable of saying things that are truly its own.
Conversely, finding something in an author or an interlocutor that is genuinely
new and un-borrowed is the sign that the author or the interlocutor is intellectu-
ally self-reliant and has a strong and beautiful soul. This does not mean that the
subject matter and everything else that falls under the rhetorical category of
21 Essays, III, 8, p. 718.
22 Essays, I, 9, p. 22.
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inventio must be entirely new. Innovation with respect to the subject matter is
an important way of saying something new (as we have seen before, Montaigne
does claim that presenting himself as the subject matter of his book is the prin-
cipal literary innovation in the Essais). However, this is not the only possible
way. One must also consider the “choice, arrangement, embellishment, and
style” (chois, disposition, ornement et langage) that the author has contrib-
uted.23 “Choice” has to do with inventio. Even if the subject matter is not new,
an author may innovate by making a choice, a selection in a series of ideas that
are traditionally invoked together, and this choice may be remarkably appro-
priate to what the author is trying to say. An author may also innovate in the
sphere of dispositio by presenting known ideas and materials in an order that
has never been seen before (“arrangement”). Finally, one may innovate in the
area of elocutio (“embellishment, and style”) by using a style that breaks with
earlier practice.
I should add that Montaigne generally manifests a good deal of contempt
for stylistic innovation. For instance, in this passage he compares it to bor-
rowed and extravagant clothes that hide the true worth of a text:
The eloquence that diverts us to itself harms its content.
As in dress it is pettiness to seek attention by some peculiar and
unusual fashion, so in language the search for novel phrases and little-
known words comes from a childish and pedantic ambition. Would
that I might use only those that are used in the markets of Paris!
Aristophanes the grammarian did not know what he was talking about
when he criticized Epicurus for the simplicity of his words and the aim
of his rhetorical art, which was simply lucidity of speech. The imita-
tion of speech, because of its facility, may be quickly picked up by a
whole people; the imitation of judgment and invention does not come
so fast. Most readers, because they have found a similar robe, think
very wrongly that they have hold of a similar body. Strength and sin-
ews are not to be borrowed; the attire and the cloak may be borrowed.24
As we have seen in previous examples, the crucial distinction here (meta-
phorically represented by the body and the clothes) is between what is alien
and what is an author’s own. Montaigne seems to say (and this is of course
counter-intuitive for a modern reader) that style is the least personal quality in
an author because it can be so easily imitated. “The imitation of judgment and
invention” is much more difficult. It is very difficult to imitate someone’s judg-
ment because, as a personal quality, good judgment is not transferable. Simi-
23 Essays, III, 8, p. 718.
24 Essays, I, 26, p. 127.
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larly, it is very difficult to imitate someone’s invention (or rather someone’s
capacity for invention) because it proceeds from the mind (esprit), a natural
and personal quality. One may wonder why Montaigne is so adamant against
stylistic innovation, since he is now acknowledged to be a stylistic innovator
himself. Here, Montaigne speaks about stylistic innovation for its own sake in
the manner of the sophists. For Montaigne in the Essais the use of new lan-
guage should always be governed by decorum: anything new about the lan-
guage must be consistent with the subject matter.
It should be emphasized here that for Montaigne although the “new” is a
fundamental criterion of literary and philosophical worth, “saying something
new” is never presented as being good for its own sake. What Montaigne seeks
is not the “new” itself but rather what the “new” points to, i.e., a “strong and
beautiful soul” in an interlocutor or an author. For Montaigne, reading and
conversation are spiritual exercises that do for the soul what physical exercise
does for the body: the stronger the training partner is, the more beneficial the
exercise is likely to be.25 This comes across very clearly in the chapter on the
education of children. Interpreters of this chapter usually insist on Montaigne’s
description of a process of appropriation: the young student who reads and
fully understands Plato owns Plato’s ideas as much as Plato himself did: “It is
no more according to Plato than according to me, since he and I understand and
see it in the same way.”26 However, the focus is not as much on intellectual
ownership as it is on intellectual activity as a way of exercising both mind and
judgment. A soul becomes “strong and beautiful” through spiritual exercise,
just as a dancer excels through persistent practice: “I wish Paluel or Pompey,
those fine dancers of my time, could teach us capers just by performing them
before us and without moving us from our seats, as those people who want to
train our understanding without setting it in motion.”27
For Montaigne, appropriating Plato’s ideas is not aimed at claiming own-
ership of those ideas. It is aimed at exercising one’s soul in order to match the
“strength and beauty” of Plato’s soul. A similar comment can be made about
the passage I quoted at the beginning of this article on Montaigne’s apprecia-
tion of the “new” in the practice of traveling: “the mind is continually exer-
cised in observing new and unknown things.”28 Observing “new and unknown”
things is not an end in itself; it is a practice aimed at making the mind stronger.
Pascal follows all these principles in Mathematical Mind. He argues for
the innovativeness of his treatise on the grounds of inventio, dispositio, and
decorum. He acknowledges that some of the rules he enunciates can be found
25 See Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Oxford, 1995).
26 Essays, I, 26, p. 111.
27 Essays, I, 26, p. 112.
28 Essays, III, 9, p. 744.
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in some well-known treatises of logic. Yet he says these precious and essential
rules are mixed up with many others that are either false or useless. As far as
inventio is concerned, the innovation consists in having chosen the rules that
are relevant and leaving out the irrelevant ones. He also acknowledges that the
rules he puts forward are familiar to mathematicians. Yet mathematicians are
few and far between. The treatise is not destined for them (because they al-
ready understand). It is useful, however, to everybody else, who will genuinely
learn something by reading the treatise. That is the innovativeness as far as
decorum is concerned. The treatise is new for its intended audience: non-math-
ematicians. Finally, Pascal argues in terms of dispositio and economy. He claims
that, unless you truly understand “the spirit of these rules,”29 you will never be
able to spell out the implications and consequences of a basic principle like
“one must define everything and prove everything.”30 This is a rebuttal to those
who would claim that such a principle is nothing new. Pascal’s reply is, if you
think it’s nothing new, then tell me exactly what it means.
As we have seen before, Pascal illustrates his discussion of the innova-
tiveness of the treatise with a comparison between Descartes and Augustine
that seeks to answer the question: did Descartes say something new when he
wrote I think, therefore I am, since Augustine said the same thing twelve hun-
dred years before? Here too, Pascal is following Montaigne, who asks the same
question with regard to Philippe de Commynes and Tacitus:
When some years ago I read Philippe de Commines, certainly a very
good author, I noted this remark as uncommon: That we must be very
careful not to serve our master so well that we keep him from finding a
fair reward for our service. I should have praised the idea [l’invention],
not him; I came across it in Tacitus not long ago: Benefits are agree-
able as long as they seem returnable; but if they go much beyond that,
they are repaid with hatred instead of gratitude. And Seneca says vig-
orously: For he who thinks it is shameful not to repay does not want
the man to live whom he ought to repay. Q. Cicero, in a weaker vein:
He who thinks he cannot repay you can by no means be your friend.31
Montaigne describes himself as a once naïve reader who admired a par-
ticular thought in Commynes (that excessive devotion towards a superior gen-
erates ingratitude) and later found out that it was a topos that could be traced
back to Cicero through Seneca and Tacitus. In this case the finding of the
conférence is that Commynes did not say anything new. Commynes did not
deserve the praise because the thought was not his own.
29 De l’Esprit géométrique, p. 140.
30 Ibid.
31 Essays, III, 8, p. 718.
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To those familiar with Pascal’s text this finding may sound somewhat dis-
appointing because Pascal makes a more striking and counterintuitive point in
Mathematical Mind. He argues that Descartes did say something new, even
though it is true that Augustine said the same thing a long time before: “Far be
it from me to say that Descartes is not the true author [of this principle], even if
it were the case that he learned it by reading that great saint.”32 According to
Pascal, an equitable reader will acknowledge that in Descartes, I think, there-
fore I am is the first principle of an entire system of physics and metaphysics. If
one examines the connections between the part and the whole, one will see that
the cogito means immensely more in Descartes than it does in Augustine. But
what about Montaigne’s judgment of Commynes? The contrast with Pascal is
remarkable. While Pascal’s judgment of Descartes and Augustine comes across
as bold and assertive, Montaigne presents himself as a cautious, even hesitant
reader. He says he will defer to those more knowledgeable than he is to decide
whether a particular thought is new or not:
We who have little contact with books are in this strait, that when we
see some fine piece of inventiveness (quelque belle invention) in a
new poet, some strong argument in a preacher, we dare not praise them
for it until we have found out from some learned man whether this
element is their own or someone else’s. Until then I always stand on
my guard.33
Determining whether Commynes said something new requires a good deal
of erudition, which Montaigne does not claim to have. Or to put it more pre-
cisely, for Montaigne assessing the innovativeness of a text requires an excel-
lent memory: one must know all the classics by heart. As every reader of
Montaigne knows, the author of the Essays complains everywhere about his
poor memory. It is very telling that after discussing the work of Tacitus at the
end of the essay Montaigne qualifies his assessment in the following way: “This
is what my memory of Tacitus offers me in gross, and rather uncertainly. All
judgments in gross are loose and imperfect.”34 In other words Montaigne is
saying that his assessment of Tacitus should not be taken too seriously because
assessing the value of a book requires an excellent memory, which he does not
have. On the other hand neither erudition nor a good memory is necessary to
determine if an interlocutor’s idea is truly his own. Here, Montaigne shows
neither caution nor hesitation. He challenges his interlocutor vigorously, or
even better, he pretends like Socrates that he does not understand the idea his
32 De l’Esprit géométrique, p. 141.
33 Essays, III, 8, p. 718.
34 Essays, III, 8, p. 721.
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interlocutor is putting forward: “We must either deliberately oppose it, or draw
back under color of not understanding it, in order to feel out on all sides how it
is lodged in its author.”35 If in response to a direct challenge or to Socratic irony
the interlocutor comes across as knowing what he his talking about, his idea is
truly his own, and he deserves Montaigne’s esteem. If not, he deserves con-
tempt because he himself does not see the value of what he says. This is how
Pascal summarizes Montaigne’s art de conférer:
Those who say the same things do not all master [possèdent] them in
the same way. This is why the incomparable author of L’Art de conférer
devotes so much care to showing that we must not judge the capacity
of a man according to the excellence of a clever remark we hear him
make. Rather, instead of concluding that the person is admirable be-
cause the words are, let us inquire, Montaigne says, into the mind that
produced them; let us find out whether it comes from memory, or from
a happy coincidence; let us receive these words coldly and with scorn,
in order to see if the person realizes that we do not value what he says
as it should be valued. Most often, he will promptly retract himself; he
will be driven away from that thought (which is better than he thinks it
is) and will arrive at a new one that is trivial and laughable. It is there-
fore necessary to gauge how that thought resides in its author, how,
through what means, and to what extent he masters it [il la possède].36
Pascal’s summary is perfectly exact and faithful, and in that sense Pascal
does not say anything new when he borrows this entire passage from Montaigne.
He innovates, however, in a subtle but decisive way. When Montaigne dis-
cusses l’art de conférer, he refers mainly to conversation between friends. The
essay does discuss literary innovation. Yet when it comes to assessing the innova-
tiveness of a text, Montaigne becomes hesitant and cautious. He defers to the
erudite reader (the one with a perfect memory) who will determine if a certain
idea has been used before. Pascal takes Montaigne’s art de conférer and ap-
plies it fully and without reservations to textual analysis. In other words the
technique described in Pascal’s treatise is entirely borrowed from Montaigne,
but in Pascal it applies to texts in addition to persons. What makes this move
possible is that for Pascal, memory is irrelevant. It makes no difference if the
cogito was in Augustine before it was in Descartes. It makes no difference if it
was there verbatim or even if Descartes took it knowingly from Augustine
instead of rediscovering it by chance. In making memory irrelevant, Pascal is
still following Montaigne. As we have seen before, for Montaigne the fact that
35 Essays, III, 8, p. 715.
36 De l’Esprit géométrique, 140.
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a man has “a reputation for learning and a good memory” says little about the
intrinsic qualities of his soul.37 Similarly, in his chapter on the education of
children Montaigne says that a student may want to forget the source of the
ideas he borrows from great writers in order to make them his own: “And let
him boldly forget, if he wants, where he got them, but let him know how to
make them his own.”38
In Montaigne these maxims apply to conversation and to pedagogy. Pascal
extends their application from persons to texts and turns them into a hermeneu-
tical principle. As far as textual analysis is concerned, Montaigne follows a
traditional exegetical model: in order to find out if a particular thought is new,
it is necessary to look at everything that has been written before. Pascal, on the
other hand, follows a dialogical model: the “new” does not emerge in a com-
parison between one passage that was written recently and possible “sources”
of this passage. The “new” is a quality that emerges when one considers the
meaning of a book in its totality. This in turn, according to Pascal, points to the
worth of a person, the author of the book. As we have seen before, the ultimate
purpose of Montaigne’s art de conférer is to test the worth of an interlocutor in
a dialogue (and to exercise one’s soul in the process). Pascal borrows this dia-
logical model and applies it to the interpretation of texts. I should add that for
Pascal the “new” should never be seen as an intrinsic quality of a text. It emerges
in a debate between two interpreters of the text: one who argues that the text
does not say anything new and the other who argues the opposite. Determining
the innovativeness of a text is an adversarial process.
Pascal concludes his discussion of Descartes and Augustine with a simile.
The thought that Descartes borrowed from Augustine is like a splendid tree
that grew in a field:
Whereas someone will say something by himself without comprehend-
ing the excellence of what he says, someone else will see a splendid
sequence of consequences in it, so much so that I dare say those are no
longer the same words; he is no more indebted to the one he learned it
from than a splendid tree belongs to the one who tossed its seed, casu-
ally and unknowingly, in a deep soil that provided a fertile environ-
ment for growth.
The same thoughts sometimes grow very differently in someone
other than their author: sterile in their native field, thriving when trans-
planted.39
37 Essays, III, 8, p. 718.
38 Essays, I, 26, p. 111.
39 De l’Esprit géométrique, 142.
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According to the simile, the cogito in Augustine is nothing but a seed, and
the splendid tree is Descartes’s philosophical system. The fertility of the soil
(i.e., the strength and beauty of Descartes’s soul) has contributed to the beauty
of the tree much more than the seed itself, which was planted there by chance.
The final thought is that some seeds thrive by being transplanted. This thought
is itself borrowed from Montaigne: “... and forms of speech, like plants, im-
prove and grow stronger by being transplanted.”40 The context of this quote is
a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the French language, where
Montaigne suggests that the French language could be enriched not through
neologisms (which he dislikes) but by borrowing from technical languages like
the language of war and hunting. Then comes the idea that words and expres-
sions gain in strength when transplanted from one field to the next. In Montaigne
the idea of transplanting is limited to the sphere of elocutio: words and expres-
sions. When he transplants this thought into his own work, Pascal makes it
grow to include not only elocutio but also inventio: the invention of the cogito
cannot be claimed for Augustine. Even though the cogito came from Augustine
originally, Descartes owns it because it grew and prospered in his soil.
Let us now see how Pascal deals with these hermeneutical issues in a some-
what more complex case, the Conversation with Monsieur de Sacy on Epictetus
and Montaigne. This text purports to be the transcription of a conversation (a
conférence, Montaigne would say) that took place between Pascal and his spiri-
tual director, Monsieur de Sacy, at Port-Royal-des-Champs. It is impossible to
know whether such a conversation actually took place. What we know is that
most of the text is the transcription by Fontaine (Sacy’s secretary) of a manu-
script in which Pascal did a comparative assessment of the philosophy of
Epictetus and the philosophy of Montaigne. The text presents the spiritual di-
rector as impressed by the strength of Pascal’s mind but unimpressed by his
doctrinal knowledge. According to Sacy, Pascal is brilliant in conversation,
what he says is sound and true, but he does not say anything new:
He did feel that everything [Pascal] said was quite true. He enjoyed
seeing the strength of his mind and of his words, but he did not see
anything new in them. Everything great Monsieur Pascal told him he
had already read in Saint Augustine.41
One could think of the entire conversation as Pascal’s effort to persuade Sacy
that he is saying something new. At the end, Sacy is at least half-persuaded, and
40 Essais, III, 5, p. 665.
41 Entretien avec M. de Sacy sur Epictète et Montaigne, in Les Provinciales, Pensées et
opuscules, 717.
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he concedes to his interlocutor that he is “surprised to see how he managed to
turn things to his advantage.”42
How does Pascal do it? He follows the same hermeneutical principles we
have discussed before. The main point of the comparison between Epictetus
and Montaigne is to show that each of them is advocating principles that are
true and valid and that each of them is also advocating principles that are false
and dangerous. The more subtle point is that each author is an antidote for the
errors of the other. The Stoic philosopher is right in saying that God is the
highest good and that the first duty of human beings is to recognize the will of
God and follow it. He errs in saying that human beings have in themselves the
ability to do so. This is a manifestation of pride, a cardinal sin. Montaigne
professes Skepticism. This is a sound doctrine because it shows the limits of
human reason and it proves that knowledge of God must come through faith.
On the other hand Skepticism makes Montaigne morally and intellectually lazy.
From a Christian point of view, says Pascal, Stoics and Skeptics err because
they do not see that there is a difference between the human condition after the
Creation and the human condition after the Fall. Stoics describe human beings
as if they were still in a pre-lapsarian state. Skeptics view human beings as if
the Fall had left them with no remembrance of God whatsoever. Therefore,
Pascal adds, one might establish a sound moral doctrine by putting Epictetus
and Montaigne together: “… since one has the truth that offsets the error of the
other, an alliance between them would result in a perfect moral doctrine.”43
However, such an alliance is impossible:
But, instead of peace, their association would only lead to war and
general destruction. Because one establishes certainty while the other
establishes doubt, and one proves the greatness of man while the other
proves his weakness, they destroy each other’s truths and errors with
equal effectiveness.44
Montaigne is an antidote for Epictetus’s pride, but his Skepticism under-
mines the Stoic’s rightful desire to know and obey God’s will. Epictetus’s de-
sire to know and obey God’s will is an antidote to Montaigne’s laziness, but it
excludes Montaigne’s healthy questioning of the powers of human reason. It is
therefore impossible to establish a coherent doctrine on the basis of an alliance
between Stoicism and Skepticism. In Pascal’s eyes this failure brings about a
success because the mutually assured destruction of Stoicism and Skepticism
makes room for the truth of the Gospel: “So much so that they can neither stand
42 Entretien avec M. de Sacy, 737.
43 Entretien avec M. de Sacy, 736.
44 Ibid.
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alone because of their shortcomings nor unite because of their differences.
Consequently, they collapse and disappear in order to give way to the truth of
the Gospel.”45 Only the Gospel, with its central figure of Christ as simulta-
neously divine and human, can teach human beings that they are both human
and divine and therefore weak (like the Skeptics say) and great (like the Stoics
say) at the same time. Only a superior form of equity, charity (i.e., the love of
Christ), can accommodate the teachings of these two opposite schools of thought.
In conclusion, Pascal recommends reading Epictetus and Montaigne to-
gether as an intellectual and moral preparation for hearing the truth of Chris-
tianity:
This is why these readings must be done in a very careful way, with
great restraint, and with full consideration of the social status and mo-
res of the intended readers. I believe nonetheless that putting these
readings together would have a good chance of success because one
offsets the bad of the other.46
This recommendation follows the principle of decorum, because it points
out that the method proposed here is not suited to everyone, and that the read-
ings must be tailored to the particular circumstances of the reader. Even more
importantly, the method itself is a form of oeconomica dispositio: it puts to-
gether two authors that are never read together, and it constitutes a complicated
and circuitous path toward the truth of Christianity. At the end of the conversa-
tion Sacy and Pascal are in the same place, but the roads they took to get there
are very different:
This is how these two great minds finally came to agreement regarding
the reading of these philosophers, and both reached the same conclu-
sion, even though they arrived at it in slightly different ways: Mon-
sieur de Sacy came to it immediately, because of his clear grasp of the
principles of Christianity; Monsieur Pascal arrived at it in a round-
about way, by following the principles of these two philosophers.47
As Kathy Eden points out, the root of the word oeconomia, oikos (the house),
is clearly present in the mind of authors like Plutarch who liken the interpreta-
tion of literature to a long journey home.48 In his essay on how the young should
read poetry (De audiendis poetis—Moralia 14D-37B) Plutarch presents the
45 Entretien avec M. de Sacy, 736.
46 Ibid., 738.
47 Ibid., 739.
48 See Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 30-36.
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study of literature as a propaedeutic to philosophy. Reaching philosophical
wisdom is like coming home, but the path towards wisdom is straight only for
those who are already wise. For everybody else coming home is an Odyssey:
like Ulysses, the young student who wants to reach philosophical wisdom must
travel through foreign lands and take the long way around before he comes
home. A similar logic applies to Pascal’s use of Epictetus and Montaigne. For
Pascal wisdom is of course Christian wisdom. The path towards this wisdom is
straight for Sacy, who is already a believer. For others whose faith may not be
as strong as Sacy’s, “a roundabout way” is the most economical one. Reading
Epictetus and Montaigne, whose messages are in many ways foreign to Chris-
tianity, is paradoxically the best way of coming home to the Christian faith.
The richness of the connotations of oikos (the house) in oeconomia does
not end here. As we have seen before in the rhetorical tradition and especially
in Quintilian the economy of a text is the relationship between the parts and the
whole. This notion is based on the image of the text as a social unit from which
no one is excluded, in which every member is at home.49 In Quintilian’s words
the various parts of a speech should not clash (non pugnantia); they should not
be like strangers (ignotae) but rather assembled by something like a social
bond (aliqua societate).50 These metaphors resurface in Pascal’s treatment of
Epictetus and Montaigne. Here the image of the text as a social unit is a prin-
ciple of interpretation, not composition, and Pascal is not reading a single text:
he is reading two texts as if they were one. It is remarkable, however, that in
keeping with the rhetorical tradition Pascal’s metaphors are political through-
out. He discusses the possibility of an “alliance” between Epictetus and
Montaigne. He then warns that instead of “peace” the coming together of these
two authors would result in “war and general destruction.”51 For anyone famil-
iar with the rest of Pascal’s work, this language brings up the imagery of civil
war that is so important in the Pensées (and in seventeenth-century political
thought in general). What Pascal is suggesting is that putting Epictetus and
Montaigne together will result in civil war.
There is continuity, therefore, between this passage from the Conversation
with Monsieur de Sacy, which deals with hermeneutics, and the famous frag-
ment in the Pensées that discusses the relationship between justice and civil
war. Pascal asks of his interlocutor, “What basis will he take for the economy
of the world he wants to rule?” (60). He then adds that if human beings had any
knowledge of true equity it would have imposed itself on all peoples: “True
equity would have enthralled all the peoples of the world with its splendor.”
However, in the realm of politics, equity has been replaced by custom: “Cus-
tom is the whole of equity.” This passage, like the texts we have seen before, is
49 See Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 28-29.
50 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 7.10.17.
51 Entretien avec M. de Sacy, 736.
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about the relationship between economy and equity, but it casts doubt on the
effectiveness of a hermeneutic approach to the law. Equity, as Aristotle under-
stands it, consists in accommodating the generality of the law to the particular
circumstances of the case. At the same time, judges who render equitable judg-
ments deepen our understanding of the law because they clarify the connection
between legal principles and their application. For Pascal, who follows
Montaigne’s Skeptical argument, trying to be equitable here would be cata-
strophic. Custom, by definition, does not stand on any principle: “Anyone who
tries to bring it back to its first principle destroys it” (ibid.). One must accept
what the law says without asking what it really means. If one inquires about the
coherence of a legal system or its connection with legal principles, one opens
up the door to infinite controversy. L’art de conférer does not apply here. “Say-
ing something new” would mean looking into the principles that underlie the
law (“return to the basic and primitive laws of the state which unjust custom
has abolished”). This, Montaigne warns (and Pascal after him), leads to civil
war.
In the light of what we have discussed, what do Pascal and Montaigne
really mean when they talk about “saying something new”? Our modern notion
of “new” does not apply here. We tend to think of it in terms of intellectual
property law: I can claim an idea or an expression as my own if no one has
claimed it before. Or we see it in terms of Romantic aesthetics: this book is new
because it is the authentic expression of its author’s radical singularity. For
Montaigne and Pascal, in order to qualify as “new” an idea must meet two
conditions: first, it must be true; second, it must be experienced as new.
Montaigne and Pascal do not see truth as a thing, an entity that exists out
there. General knowledge is meaningless until it is particularized. A “truth”
comes to life only when it has been internalized and appropriated. An idea is
true, and it is our own only when it has become a part of who we are. That is
because for Montaigne and Pascal a “truth” is first and foremost, a truth about
ourselves. It is something about ourselves that was always there, undiscovered,
and comes to light through reading or conversation. As Pascal puts it, “it is not
in Montaigne but in myself that I find everything I see there” (689). In this
fragment Pascal combines two Augustinian lines of thought. The first one, which
comes via Montaigne, is the idea that truth cannot be owned privately and
therefore belongs to everyone: “truth and reason are common to everyone, and
no more belong to the man who first spoke them than to the man who says them
later.”52 The second one is Augustine’s reinterpretation of the Delphic formula,
52 Essays, I, 26, p. 111. See Augustine, De libero arbitrio, 2.12.33, and Kathy Eden, Friends
Hold All Things in Common, 132-34; also Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, letter 12, tr.
Richard M. Gummere (London, 1925), I, 73: “ ‘Epicurus,’ inquis, ‘dixit. Quid tibi cum alieno?’
Quod verum est, meum est.” (“Epicurus,” you reply, “uttered these words; what are you doing
with another’s property?” Any truth, I maintain, is my property.)
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know thyself: “Do not wander far and wide but return into yourself, it is in the
inner person that truth dwells.”53 Pascal follows Augustine in asserting that the
most cogent truths are the truths about ourselves, because self-knowledge is
the foundation of all knowledge. What Pascal brings to this Augustinian tradi-
tion is a vivid description of the experience of self-knowledge that takes place
not only through introspection but also through reading or conversation: “When
some passion or effect is described in a natural style, we find within ourselves
the truth of what we hear, without knowing it was there. We are consequently
inclined to like the person who made us feel it, for he has shown us not his
wealth but our own ...” (652).
The epiphany that Pascal describes here does not happen very often, be-
cause it requires a specific kind of writing, the “natural style.” In a fragment
discussing those philosophers “who have dealt with self-knowledge,”54 Pascal
establishes a clear contrast between “Charron’s depressing and tedious divi-
sions”55 and “Montaigne’s muddle,”56 which is—paradoxically—a model of
composition. Authors who write like Montaigne are few and far between. Most
authors are like Charron: they follow a straight, linear path; they are predict-
able; they do not surprise us. When we are lucky enough to find an author like
Montaigne (who practices what the rhetorical tradition calls oeconomica
dispositio), what we read comes across as new and different: “When we see a
natural style we are quite amazed and delighted, because we expected to see an
author and find a man ...” (675).
For Pascal, the “new” is the delightful surprise we experience when we
learn something about ourselves in reading or conversation. This pertains to
dispositio, as we have just seen. It also pertains to ethos: the experience of the
“new” is possible only when the author of the book we read comes across as a
fellow human being with whom we’re having a free, open, and sincere conver-
sation.57 If that kind of ethos is missing, the interlocutor comes across as a
writer rather than a person. As Pascal puts it by quoting Petronius, “plus poetice
quam humane locutus es” (you have spoken more as a poet than a man).58 This
is why Pascal and Montaigne seek to identify in an interlocutor what is truly
his own. It is only when we have grasped who the interlocutor really is that we
can learn something about who we are, and what it is to be human. Classical
moralists like Pascal are sometimes criticized for speaking in generalities about
53 Augustine, De vera religione, 39.72: “Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi; in interiore homine
habitat veritas”; and see Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 65-67.
54 Pensées, 780.
55 Ibid. Cf. Pierre Charron’s De la sagesse (Bordeaux, 1601).
56 Ibid.
57 See Marc Fumaroli, “Les Essais de Montaigne: l’éloquence du for intérieur” in La
Diplomatie de l’esprit (Paris, 1994), 125-61; also Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 6.2.8-19.
58 Pensées, 675.
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human beings, and for having an essentialist view of human nature.59 It can be
argued that the opposite is true: the main lesson of l’art de conférer is that an
idea comes to life only when it has been appropriated and internalized by one
person. If it sits out there, out of context, it may seem banal and empty. But its
banality does not prevent it from being true or rather from becoming true when
it is uttered by someone who really understands what it means. In Mathemati-
cal Mind after having vigorously argued that his ideas are new, Pascal con-
cludes that instead of calling them “great, lofty, elevated, sublime,” he would
rather call them “lowly, common, familiar.”60 For Pascal there is no contradic-
tion between “saying something new” and saying something ordinary and fa-
miliar.
Columbia University.
59 See Roland Barthes, “La Rochefoucauld: Réflexions ou Sentences et Maximes,” in Le
Degré zéro de l’écriture, suivi de Nouveaux essais critiques (Paris, 1972), 69-88.
60 De l’Esprit géométrique, 145.
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